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THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES three rules of evidence relating to the
introduction of writings: (1) the requirement of authentication, (2)
the Best and Secondary Evidence Rules, and (3) the completeness
doctrine. The Article compares the approach of the California Evi-
dence Code ("Code") with that of the Federal Rules of Evidence
("Rules") to objections based on these rules. Since the Uniform Rules
of Evidence ("Uniform Rules") largely track the federal provisions re-
lating to authentication, the Best Evidence Rule, and the complete-
ness doctrine, this Article does not discuss the Uniform Rules.'
Part I examines the concept of authentication in the Rules and
the Code and recommends that the Code more closely mirror the
Rules by explicitly referencing non-writings and providing an addi-
tional presumption of admissibility for commercial and mercantile
brands.2 Part II explores the similarities between the Federal Best Evi-
dence Rule and the California Secondary Evidence Rule and con-
cludes that California should retain the Secondary Evidence Rule,
which recently replaced its version of the Best Evidence Rule. Part III
discusses the completeness doctrine, a rule that also applies to the
introductions of writings. The doctrine seeks to avoid the misimpres-
sions that can be created when only a part of a declaration is offered
in evidence. It requires the introduction of any other declaration,
which in fairness ought to be considered with the part introduced.
Part III recommends retaining the California provision. Unlike its fed-
eral counterpart, the California rule is not limited to writings but in-
cludes conversations as well.
This Article is the sixth paper of a study commissioned by the
California Law Revision Commission ("Commission") to assess
whether the California Evidence Code should be conformed to the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The version prepared for the Commission
was submitted to the Commission on October 30, 2005 and can be
viewed on the Commission's website. 3 The California Legislature cre-
1. Compare UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 901-1008, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, with
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 106, 901-1008. Although their substance is largely the same,
the language of the Uniform Rules and Federal Rules of Evidence is not identical.
2. FED. R. EviD. 902(7).
3. California Law Revision Commission, http://www.clrc.ca.gov/H850.html (last vis-
ited Aug. 2, 2006).
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ated the Commission in 1953 as the permanent successor to the Code
Commission. 4 Its chief responsibility is to review California statutory
and decisional law to discover defects and anachronisms and to rec-
ommend legislation to make needed reforms. 5
The California and federal provisions were in effect as of Decem-
ber 2004. To assist the reader, the pertinent code sections and rules
are reproduced as an appendix to the Article.
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations contained in
this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent or
reflect the opinions, conclusions, or recommendations of the
Commission.
I. The Requirement of Authentication
A. Authentication Generally: The Role of the Judge and Jury
Whenever a proponent offers a writing in evidence, the propo-
nent must also present enough evidence to permit the judge to find
that the writing is what the proponent claims it to be. 6 If, for example,
the plaintiff offers a writing, which he claims is the contract that he
and the defendant entered into, then the plaintiff must offer some
evidence indicating that the writing is indeed that contract. In the
words of the California Law Revision Commission, the plaintiff must
show that the writing is "authentic," i.e., the exact contract entered
into between the parties.7 If the writing is not the contract, then the
writing is irrelevant and inadmissible.
Because authentication is a form of relevance, it substantially lim-
its the role of the judge when ruling on an authentication objection.8
If, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the
judge concludes that a reasonable jury could find the writing to be the
contract, then the judge must let the issue of the contract's authentic-
ity go to the jury.9 The defendant may offer evidence disputing the
writing's authenticity. However, such evidence will not prevent the in-
troduction of the writing so long as the plaintiffs evidence is "suffi-
cient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of
4. California Law Revision Commission, http://www.clrc.ca.gov/background.html
(last visited Aug. 24, 2006).
5. Id.
6. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1400 (West 1995).
7. Id. § 1400 (comment).
8. Id.
9. Id. §§ 403(a) (3), 1400.
Summer 20061
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
the evidence claims it is."'1 It is up to the jury, not the judge, to decide
from all of the evidence whether the writing is in fact the contract
entered into by the parties. Il If the writing is received in evidence, the
defendant can require the judge to instruct the jurors to disregard the
writing unless they first find that it is the contract. 12 The limiting in-
struction, combined with the sufficiency standard, assures that the ju-
rors will have the last word on the contract's authenticity.
Although authentication is usually associated with writings, the
concept applies whenever any tangible object is offered in evidence. 13
Whether the object is the knife the prosecution believes the accused
used to kill the victim or the ladder the plaintiff claims was defective,
the proponent must connect the object with the case. Showing that
the object is relevant to the pending issues will require some evidence
that the object is what the proponent claims it to be. For purposes of
admissibility, the quantum of evidence, as in the case of writings,
needs to satisfy only a sufficiency standard. 14
Under the Code and the Rules, a trial judge may admit evidence
on the condition that the proponent supply the evidence connecting
the item with the case before the close of evidence. 15 Thus, a judge
may admit the purported contract, knife, or ladder, subject to a mo-
tion to strike if the proponent fails to furnish the connecting
evidence. 16
B. Authentication Under the California Evidence Code
The various Code provisions describing the manner in which the
requirement of authentication can be satisfied assume that the object
to be authenticated is a writing. The provisions are not exclusive, but
10. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1400 (West 1995).
11. Id. § 1400 (comment).
12. Id. § 403(c)(1)-(2).
13. Id. § 1400 (comment).
14. Id. § 403(a)(1).
15. Id. § 403(b).
16. California Evidence Code section 403(b) does not empower judges to admit the
testimony of a witness on the condition that the proponent later demonstrate the witness's
personal knowledge of the subject matter of the testimony. Against a lack of personal
knowledge objection, the proponent must show the witness's personal knowledge before
the witness can continue with the testimony. Id. § 702(a). Section 1401(a) provides that
"[a]uthentication of a writing is required before it may be received in evidence." Id.
§ 1401(a). But since section 1401(a) is not exempted by section 403(b), presumably the
requirement is not violated if the writing is received only conditionally.
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are illustrative only, and the proponent is free to use any otherwise
admissible evidence to identify a writing. 17
Anyone who sees a writing made or executed may authenticate
the writing.' 8 Where the party against whom the writing is offered has
admitted its authenticity or has treated the writing as authentic, courts
may consider the writing authenticated.' 9 Evidence that the writing is
a direct response by the person who the proponent of the evidence
claims authored the writing may serve to authenticate a writing.20
Likewise, evidence referring to or stating matters that are unlikely to
be known to anyone other than the person the proponent claims as
the maker of the writing may serve to authenticate a writing.21
Evidence that the writing is in the handwriting of the maker may
authenticate a writing, or if signed, that the signature is the maker's. 22
A lay witness who has personal knowledge of the maker's handwriting
or signature can give an opinion on whether the handwriting or signa-
ture is the maker's. 23 The ways in which the witness acquires the per-
sonal knowledge include: seeing the purported maker write or sign,24
seeing a writing purporting to be in the handwriting of the supposed
maker and upon which the supposed maker has acted,25 or receiving
letters from the supposed maker in response to letters duly addressed
and mailed by the witness to the supposed maker. 26
An expert can give an opinion as to the authenticity of a writing
by comparing the writing with one that has been authenticated as hav-
ing been prepared or signed by the purported maker.27 This method
applies to any form of writing, not just handwriting, since experts can
now compare typewritten specimens and other forms of writing as ac-
curately as they can compare handwritten specimens. 28
A proponent may also authenticate a handwritten document by
providing the fact finder, whether judge or jury, with a specimen
which the court finds was admitted or treated as authentic by the party
17. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1410 (West 1995).
18. Id. § 1413.
19. Id. § 1414.
20. Id. § 1420.
21. Id. § 1421.
22. Id. § 1415.
23. Id. § 1416.
24. Id. § 1416(a).
25. Id. § 1416(b).
26. Id. § 1416(c).
27. Id. § 1418.
28. Id. § 1418 (comment).
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against whom the handwritten document is offered.29 In this case, it is
the fact finder rather than the expert who makes the comparison. In
all cases, however, it is the fact finder who determines whether the
purported writing is in fact what the proponent claims it to be.
As to acknowledged writings, the California Civil Code provides
for the "acknowledgment" of such instruments as conveyances.30 An
acknowledgment consists of a certificate in which a designated officer
certifies that the person signing the instrument personally appeared
before the officer and declared to the officer that he signed the instru-
ment in his authorized capacity. 31 If the certificate meets the require-
ments of the Civil Code, then the Evidence Code provides that courts
may receive the certificate as prima facie evidence of the facts recited
in the certificate.3 2 Courts may also treat the certificate as prima facie
evidence of the authenticity of the signature of the person who pur-
portedly has signed the instrument.33 Since authenticity raises a suffi-
ciency issue, the certificate should permit the proponent to get to the
issue of whether the signature appearing in the instrument is that of
the person who appeared before the officer to the jury.
The Code, however, does not include wills among acknowledged
writings. 34 But the Code does include another presumption favoring
the authentication of some documents, including wills, affecting prop-
erty interests. Section 643 treats a deed, will, or other writing purport-
ing to create, terminate, or affect an interest in real or personal
property as authentic if the writing is at least thirty years old; is in such
condition as to create no suspicion about its authenticity; was kept or,
if found, was found in a place where one would likely encounter such
a writing; and the writing has been generally acted upon as authentic
by persons having an interest in the matter. 35 The presumption cre-
ated by section 643 does not affect the persuasion burden regarding
the authenticity of the writing. If the opponent introduces some evi-
dence contesting the document's authenticity, the proponent will
29. Id. § 1417.
30. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1180-1207 (West 1982).
31. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1189 (West 1982 & Supp. 2006).
32. CAL. EVD. CODE § 1451 (West 1995).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 643.
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have the burden of establishing its authenticity by the appropriate
persuasion standard without the benefit of the presumption. 36
Seals designate the official status of some writings. Section 1452
provides that a seal is presumed to be genuine and its use authorized
if it purports to be the seal of the United States, a public entity in the
United States, a nation recognized by the United States, a public en-
tity in a nation recognized by the United States, or a notary public
within any state of the United States. 37 Accordingly, the presence of
such a seal authenticates the writing as an official writing of the entity
entitled to the use of the seal. The presumption created by section
1452 affects only the burden of producing evidence. If the party op-
posing the writing introduces evidence sufficient to sustain a finding
that the seal is not genuine or its use is not authorized, then the fact
finder will have to determine the authenticity of the writing, including
the seal, without recourse to any presumption.3 8 If, on the other hand,
the opponent introduces no evidence challenging the genuineness of
the seal or its use, then the fact finder will be required to find the
writing authentic. 39
Signatures can serve the same function as seals in designating cer-
tain writings as official. Section 1453 creates the following presump-
tion for signatures:
A signature is presumed to be genuine and authorized if it pur-
ports to be the signature, affixed in his official capacity, of: (a) A
public employee of the United States. (b) A public employee of
any public entity in the United States. (c) A notary public within
any state of the United States.40
Accordingly, the presence of such a signature will authenticate the
writing as an official writing of the entity of the employee whose signa-
ture appears. The presumption created by section 1453 is the same as
the presumption created by section 1452. If the party opposing the
writing introduces evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that the sig-
nature is not genuine or not authorized, then the fact finder will have
to determine the authenticity of the writing without recourse to the
presumption. 4' If the opponent fails to challenge the genuineness of
36. Id. § 630. For a discussion of the effects of different presumptions on the burden
of persuasion, see MIGUEL A. MENDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE AND THE FEDERAL
RULES-A PROBLEM APPROACH §§ 18.04-18.06 (3d ed. 2004).
37. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1452 (West 1995).
38. Id. (comment); MENDEZ, supra note 36, §§ 18.04-18.06.
39. Id. (comment); MENDEZ, supra note 36, §§ 18.04-18.06.
40. Id. (comment); MENDEZ, supra note 36, §§ 18.04-18.06.
41. Id. § 1450 (comment); MENDEZ, supra note 36, §§ 18.04-18.06.
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the signature or its use, then the fact finder must find that the docu-
ment is authentic. 42
A purported copy of a writing in the custody of a public entity is
prima facie evidence of the existence and content of such a writing if
the copy purports to be published by the authority of the public entity
in which the writing is kept.4 3 A purported copy of a writing in the
custody of a public entity is also prima facie evidence of the existence
and content of such a writing if the office in which the writing is kept
is within the United States and the copy is attested or certified as a
correct copy of the writing by a public employee having legal custody
of the writing.44 Although the attestation or certification is an out-of-
court statement asserting the copy's authenticity, the attestation or
certification may be received for the truth as an exception to the hear-
say rule.45
The Code does not use self-authentication. Instead, it uses pre-
sumptions to favor the authentication of some writings. As has been
noted, these presumptions favor the authentication of acknowledged
documents, 46 some writings affecting interests in real or personal
property,47 documents bearing official seals, 48 and documents bearing
official signatures. 49 In addition, under the Code, a book purporting
to be printed or published by a public authority is presumed to have
been so printed or published; 50 a book purporting to contain reports
of cases adjudged in the tribunals of the state or nation where the
book is published is presumed to contain correct reports of those
cases;51 and printed materials purporting to be a particular newspaper
or periodical are presumed to be that newspaper or periodical if regu-
42. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1450 (comment) (West 1995); MENDEZ, supra note 36,
§§ 18.04-18.06.
43. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1530(a)(1).
44. Id. § 1530(a) (2). If the office in which the writing is kept is not within the United
States, additional attestation requirements must be met. See id. § 1530(a) (3).
45. Id. § 1530 (comment). The hearsay exception is only for the attestation or certifi-
cation. See id. § 1453. Whether or not the contents of the copy of the writing are admissible
for the truth of the matters stated depends on the hearsay rule and its exceptions. Some
courts still miss this point. See, e.g., In reKirk, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 654 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(mistakenly asserting that the hearsay exception for the certification created a hearsay ex-
ception for the contents of the writing).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
47. See supra text accompanying note 35.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
50. CAL. EVID. CODE § 644 (West 1995).
51. Id. § 645 (comment).
[Vol. 41
larly issued at average intervals not exceeding three months.52 These
presumptions do not shift the burden of persuasion with regard to the
existence of the presumed fact. If the opponent introduces some evi-
dence contesting the authenticity of the book or periodical, the pro-
ponent must convince the fact finder of the document's authenticity
by the appropriate persuasion standard without the aid of the
presumption. 53
C. Authentication Under the Federal Rules
Under the Rules, as under the Code, authentication presents a
sufficiency issue. It is satisfied by "evidence sufficient to support a find-
ing that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."54 The
methods employed to authenticate are similar to those found in the
Code. 55 The Rules, like the Code, provide that the methods enumer-
ated are illustrative, not exclusive. 56 And like the Code, the Rules also
allow the judge to admit an item of evidence subject to a motion to
strike if the proponent fails to connect the item with the case before
the close of the evidence. 57
The Rules differ from the Code in two important respects. First,
the requirement of authentication is not limited to writings. The
Rules make explicit what the Code implies-that the requirement of
authentication applies to any tangible object that is offered in evi-
dence.58 Although the Rules contain no special provisions for authen-
ticating chattel, the Rules do give special attention to voice
identification and computer printouts. A voice can be identified by
anyone who acquired the necessary knowledge by hearing the voice at
any time under circumstances connecting the voice with the alleged
speaker. 59 A computer printout can be authenticated by evidence
describing the process or system used to produce the result and show-
ing that the process or system produces an accurate result.60
52. Id. § 645.1.
53. Id. § 630.
54. FED. R. EVD. 901(a).
55. See id. R. 901(b).
56. Id.
57. FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
58. Whereas California Evidence Code section 1400 refers to the authentication of a
"writing," Federal Rule of Evidence 901 refers to the authentication of "the matter in
question."
59. FED. R. EVID. 901(b) (5). For the requirements for identifying telephone conversa-
tions, refer to R. 901 (b) (6).
60. FED. R. EVID. 901(b) (9). For an extended discussion of the admissibility of com-
puter printouts as an exception to the hearsay rule, see MENDEZ, supra note 36, § 10.05.
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Second, unlike the Code, the Rules also provide for the "self-au-
thentication" of certain writings.6' If a writing qualifies for self-authen-
tication, no extrinsic evidence of authenticity is required as a
condition of admissibility. 62 These writings include domestic public
documents under seal, certified copies of public records, acknowl-
edged documents, official publications, newspapers and periodicals,
trade inscriptions, and commercial paper.63
D. The Code Should Adopt the Rules' Explicit Language
Regarding Non-Writings, Commercial, and Mercantile
Brands
Substantial overlap characterizes the approach taken by both the
Code and the Rules regarding authentication. Most differences ap-
pear to be the product of drafting choices and do not raise significant
policy concerns. Accordingly, the Code's provisions relating to au-
thentication should generally be retained. Consideration, however,
should be given to amending the Code's definition of authentication
to expressly include all tangible items offered in evidence, not just
writings. The Rules achieve this goal by referring to the authentication
of "the matter in question" and notjust a "writing" as does the Code.64
In addition, Code drafters should consider including the Rules'
provisions on the self-authentication of "trade inscriptions, signs, tags,
or labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of business
and indicating ownership, control, or origin." 65 As the Advisory Com-
mittee points out, several factors justify dispensing with preliminary
proof of the authenticity of commercial and mercantile brands. "The
risk of forgery is minimal. Trademark infringement involves serious
penalties. Great efforts are devoted to inducing the public to buy in
reliance on brand names, and substantial protection is given to
them."66 Moreover, the opponent is still free to offer evidence to show
that the item offered is not authentic and to urge the fact finders to
disregard the item unless they find by the appropriate persuasion stan-
dard from all of the evidence that the item is what the proponent
claims it to be. 6 7 If the Code's preference for presumptions instead of
61. FED. R. EVID. 902.
62. Id.
63. Id. R. 902(1), (4)-(9).
64. Compare FED. R. EVID 901(a) with CAL. EVID. CODE § 1400 (West 1995).
65. FED. R. EVID. 902(7).
66. Id. (Advisory Committee's note).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
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self-authentication is retained, a provision should be added making
trade inscriptions and the like prima facie evidence of their identity.
11. The Best Evidence and Secondary Evidence Rules
A. Proof of Writings-Convergence and Divergence
1. Definitions
Unless certain exceptional circumstances exist, the Best Evidence
Rule requires the use of the original of a writing to prove its content
rather than testimony recounting its contents or a copy of the writ-
ing.68 A major purpose of the rule is to minimize the possibility of
misinterpretation that could occur if the production of the original
writing were not required to prove its contents. 69
Both the Code and the Rules define an original as the writing
itself or "any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person
executing or issuing it. ' ' 70 Thus, if the parties to a contract intend for
the pink copy to serve as the original, that is the original for purposes
of the Best Evidence Rule. The "original" of a photograph includes
the negative or any print of the negative.7' For information stored in a
computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by
sight, shown to reflect the information accurately, is an original. 72
Both the Code and the Rules also define writings broadly. Under
the Code, for example, writings include "handwriting, typewriting,
printing.., photocopying, transmitting by electronic mail or facsim-
ile, and every other means of recording upon any tangible thing any
form of communication or representation." 73 Accordingly, testimony
describing X-rays violates the Best Evidence Rule unless the X-rays
have been received in evidence.74
Since the concern "is with getting the words or other contents
before the court with accuracy and precision,. . . a counterpart serves
equally as well as the original, if the counterpart is the product of a
method which insures accuracy and genuineness. ' 75 Accordingly, the
Rules allow a "duplicate" in lieu of the original, unless a genuine ques-
68. FED. R. EvIw. 1002.
69. FED. R. EvID. 1001 (Advisory Committee's note).
70. CAL. EviD. CODE § 255; see also FED. R. EvID. 1001 (3).
71. CAL. EVID. CODE § 255; see also FED. R. EVI. 1001(3).
72. CAL. EVID. CODE § 255; see also FED. R. EvIo. 1001 (3).
73. CAL.. EVID. CODE § 250. In addition, the Rules include writings produced by mag-
netic impulse or by mechanical or electronic recording. FED. R. EVI. 1001(1).
74. Sirico v. Cotto, 324 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
75. FED. R. EvD. 1003 (Advisory Committee's note).
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tion is raised about the original's authenticity or under the circum-
stances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate. 76 Duplicates are
admissible also in California but under a broader provision known as
the Secondary Evidence Rule. 77 The Secondary Evidence Rule sub-
sumes the duplicate-original doctrine of the Rules by permitting a
party in the first instance to offer secondary evidence of the original. 78
The Code and the Rules define a duplicate as "a counterpart pro-
duced by the same impression as the original, or from the same ma-
trix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and
miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemi-
cal reproduction, or by other equivalent technique which accurately
reproduces the original."79 Thus, a photograph of a police artist's
sketch of a suspect can be offered in place of the sketch.80 But because
of the possibility of error, manually produced copies, whether hand-
written or typed, are not within the definition. 81
2. Changing Times Call for an Expansion of the Best Evidence
Rule: California's Secondary Evidence Rule Is a Step in
the Right Direction
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence continue to apply the
classic formulation of the Best Evidence Rule, 82 in 1999, the California
Legislature replaced the Best Evidence Rule with the Secondary Evi-
dence Rule. A number of factors moved the California Legislature to
give secondary evidence the same status as the original writing in prov-
ing the contents of a writing. Broad pretrial discovery gives civil liti-
gants an opportunity to inspect the originals, thereby reducing the
need to produce the originals in court to assure accuracy. Technologi-
cal developments, especially the rise of facsimile transmission and
electronic mail, pose unanticipated difficulties in ascertaining which
document is the "original." Moreover, a party bent on creating fraudu-
lent documents is not likely to be deterred by the rule, and insisting
on the use of the original increases litigation costs unnecessarily.83
76. FED. R. EVID. 1003.
77. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1521(d).
78. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1521.
79. CAL. EVID. CODE § 260; see also FED. R. EVID. 1001 (4).
80. People v. Garcia, 247 Cal. Rptr. 94, 96-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
81. See FED. R. EVID. 1001 (4) (Advisory Committee's note).
82. Id. R. 1002.
83. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1521 (Law Revision Commission's comment); see also 26 CAL. L.
REV. COMM'N, REPORTS 369 (1996) (discussing the Best Evidence Rule) [hereinafter COM-
MISSION REPORTS].
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Under the new rule, any secondary evidence of an original is as
admissible as the original unless (1) a genuine dispute exists concern-
ing the material terms of the writing and justice requires the exclu-
sion, or (2) admission of the secondary evidence would be unfair.84
The new rule, however, does not relax the requirements of authenti-
cation. Accordingly, a party offering a copy (as opposed to testimony)
of the original must still produce evidence demonstrating that the
copy is a true copy of a duly authenticated original.85
In determining whether it would be unfair to admit a copy, Cali-
fornia judges may consider a broad range of factors, for example: (1)
whether the proponent attempts to use the writing in a manner that
could not reasonably have been anticipated, (2) whether the original
was suppressed in discovery, (3) whether discovery conducted in a rea-
sonably diligent (as opposed to exhaustive) manner failed to result in
production of the original, (4) whether there are dramatic differences
between the original and the secondary evidence (e.g., the original
but not the secondary evidence is in color and the colors provide sig-
nificant clues to interpretation), (5) whether the original is unavaila-
ble and, if so, why, and (6) whether the writing is central to the case or
collateral.8 6
Because discovery is narrower in California criminal cases than in
civil cases, secondary evidence in criminal cases must clear an addi-
tional hurdle before it can be admitted.8 7 Even if no genuine dispute
exists about the terms of the original, and even if it were fair to receive
the secondary evidence, the trial judge nonetheless must exclude the
evidence if the judge determines that the original is in the propo-
nent's possession, custody, or control, and the proponent has not
made the original reasonably available for inspection at or before the
trial .8 This limitation, however, does not apply if the proponent is
offering a duplicate.89
84. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1521 (a).
85. Id. § 1521(c).
86. Id. § 1521 (comment).
87. Id. § 1522 (comment).
88. Id. § 1522. This requirement is subject to a number of exceptions. The require-
ment does not apply to duplicate originals, writings that are not closely related to the
controlling issues in the action, or a copy of a writing that is in the custody of a public
entity or that is recorded in the public records. Id.
89. Id.
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3. Applying the Best and Secondary Evidence Rules: More
Similarities than Differences
The Federal Best Evidence Rule and the California Secondary Ev-
idence Rule apply only when the proponent seeks to prove the con-
tents of a writing. They do not apply simply because the proponent
seeks to prove conversations that may have also been recorded or re-
duced to writing.90 For example, in Meyers v. United States,91 the prose-
cution sought to prove the testimony that a witness gave to a
congressional committee. 92 The prosecution did so by calling the law-
yer who examined the witness before the committee. 93 The accused
claimed that the lawyer's testimony violated the Best Evidence Rule
because the witness's congressional testimony had been taken down
by a stenographer. 94 The reviewing court rejected the accused's
claim.95 The prosecution was seeking to prove not the contents of the
stenographic record but the lawyer's recollection of what the witness
had said before the committee. 96 Had the prosecution sought to
prove the contents of the stenographic record, then the accused's ob-
jection would have been well taken. 97
The distinction drawn in Meyers applies to any stenographic re-
cord. For example, so long as the proponent is not attempting to
prove the contents of a deposition or of the record formed at a pre-
liminary hearing, the proponent may elicit testimony about what the
deponent or the witness said without violating the Best or Secondary
Evidence Rules. The distinction applies to other records as well: pay-
ment may be proved without producing a written receipt, and earn-
ings may be proved without producing the books of account, as long
as the proponent is not seeking to prove the contents of the written
record.9 8
Whether the Best Evidence and Secondary Evidence Rules should
encompass chattel has been controversial. Over objection, should tes-
timony be received that a shirt found in a stolen car had a laundry tag
with the defendant's initials? Since such inscriptions are within the
90. People v. Johnson, 114 Cal. Rptr. 545, 554 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (noting a police
officer may relate the accused's confession in court even though it was recorded).
91. 171 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
92. Id. at 802-803, 812.
93. Id. at 802-803.
94. Id. at 812.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 812-813.
98. FED. R. EvID. 1002 (Advisory Committee's note).
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broad definition of a writing, compliance, unless excused, would re-
quire the production of the shirt. In People v. Mastin,9 9 the court re-
jected such a strict reading of California's old Best Evidence Rule.
Instead, the court opted for the federal practice of leaving the applica-
tion of the rule to the discretion of the trial judge. The court stated
that in exercising discretion, the judge should consider the following:
The importance of examining the original and the difficulties in-
volved in its production-the more complex the inscription, the
less reliable the secondary evidence. The more critical the fact to
be proved by the inscription, and the lesser the quantity and qual-
ity of other evidence to prove that fact, the greater is the impor-
tance of the inscribed chattel's production. The more difficult the
production or the more inconvenience to the owner by temporary
loss of the chattel, the greater must be the importance of examin-
ing the original before production is required. 10 0
As a practical matter, since photographic duplicates can generally
be offered in lieu of the original in federal and California courts, the
availability of photographs of inscribed chattel has dampened the de-
bate.10 ' In California, photographs of graffiti are expressly admissible
in vandalism actions to prove that the accused was the author.
0 2
The Advisory Committee takes the position that under the Rules,
testimony that a writing does not contain any reference to designated
matter does not implicate the Best Evidence Rule.10 3 But since such
testimony proves the contents of a writing indirectly, in California the
argument can be made that the testimony violates the Secondary Evi-
dence Rule. 10 4
B. Exceptions to the Best Evidence Rule
The Federal Best Evidence Rule does not require use of the origi-
nal if it has been lost or destroyed, unless the proponent lost or de-
stroyed the original in bad faith.10 5 The Federal Rule does not require
using the original where it cannot be obtained by available judicial
process or procedure. 10 6 Nor does the Rule require the original if at
99. 171 Cal. Rptr. 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
100. Id. at 783.
101. In California, resort to the duplicate-original doctrine is no longer necessary. As a
general rule, secondary evidence is admissible as the original. CAL. Evin. CODE § 1521
(West 1995) (For example, a photograph of a shirt is admissible as the shirt). This is so
even in a criminal case such as Mastin. See CAL. EVI,. CODE § 1522(a)(1).
102. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1410.5.
103. FED. R. EvID. 1002 (Advisory Committee's note).
104. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1521.
105. FED. R. EVID. 1004(1).
106. Id. R. 1004(2).
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the time when the original was under the control of the opponent,
the opponent was put on notice by the pleadings (or otherwise) that
the contents would be a subject of proof at the hearing, and the oppo-
nent does not produce the original at the hearing. 10 7 Furthermore,
the Federal Best Evidence Rule does not demand the original if it is
not closely related to the controlling issues.' 08 As noted earlier, an
original also is not required if the proponent offers a duplicate of the
original. 109
The Rules also provide that testimony or deposition of the ad-
verse party or that party's written admission may be used to prove the
contents of a writing without accounting for the nonproduction of the
original. 110
The Rules do not express a preference for a copy of a private
writing that is unavailable. They allow the proponent to prove the con-
tents of the original by a copy or by testimony if production of the
original writing is excused.
Under the Rules, the contents of an official record or of a docu-
ment authorized to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed
do not have to be proved by the original record or document.11' In
this instance, however, testimony is inadmissible and the proponent
must offer a copy certified or testified to be correct, unless a copy
cannot be obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence. 112
By adopting the Secondary Evidence Rule the California Legisla-
ture eliminated the numerous exceptions to the state's version of the
Best Evidence Rule. 1 3 The Secondary Evidence Rule, however, retains
the Code's preference for hard copies as opposed to testimony except
(1) where "the proponent does not have possession or control of a
copy and the original is lost or has been destroyed without fraudulent
intent on the part of the proponent,"114 and (2) "where the propo-
nent does not have possession or control of the original or a copy'11 5
107. Id. R. 1004(3).
108. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1504 (repealed); FED. R. EVID. 1004(4).
109. See supra text accompanying note 76.
110. FED. R. EvD. 1007. The Code does not have an equivalent provision. Presumably,
proof of the contents of the original by these methods could satisfy the requirements of the
Secondary Evidence Rule. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1521, 1523.
111. FED. R. EVD. 1005.
112. Id.
113. Indeed, the amendment repeals the Best Evidence Rule. See CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1521 (comment). The name is retained here for ease of analysis and comparison to the
Federal Rules.
114. Id. § 1523(b).
115. Id. § 1523(c).
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and (a) "neither the writing nor a copy of the writing was reasonably
procurable by the proponent by use of the court's process or by other
available means,"' 16 or (b) the original "is not closely related to the
controlling issues and it would be inexpedient to require its produc-
tion."'1 7 Since copies of official records and documents authorized to
be recorded or filed are generally available, copies, rather than testi-
mony, must be offered to prove the contents of the originals.
C. The Exceptions Swallow the Rule
The Best Evidence Rule has evolved from a strict rule requiring
production of the original to prove the contents of a writing in most
instances to one in which production of the original may now be the
exception. As the Federal Rules illustrate, exceptions have multiplied
as the rules of evidence have become codified. Public records may be
proved by copies 1 8 as may writings that are not closely related to con-
trolling issues." 19 In addition, the contents of a writing may be proved
by the testimony of the party opponent. 120 Perhaps the greatest relaxa-
tion of the rule occurred with the adoption of the duplicate-original
doctrine. As has been noted, this doctrine permits the admission of a
duplicate to the same extent as the original unless "(1) a genuine
question is raised about the authenticity of the original or (2) in the
circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate."12 1
Viewed from this perspective, California took the next logical
step when it replaced the Best Evidence Rule with the Secondary Evi-
dence Rule. California parties may now dispense with the original and
use secondary evidence to prove the contents of a writing unless the
judge finds that it would be unfair to admit the secondary evidence or
that production of the original is necessary to resolve a genuine dis-
pute concerning the material terms of the original writing. 22 Pub-
lished opinions do not disclose any substantial difficulties for courts or
parties under the new rule. California should retain its novel, liberal-
ized approach to the admissibility of secondary evidence to prove the
contents of writings.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. FED. R. EvwD. 1005.
119. Id. R. 1004(4).
120. Id. R. 1007.
121. Id. R. 1003.
122. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1521(a).
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D. Functions of the Judge and Jury Under the Best and Secondary
Evidence Rules
1. Federal Rules
Federal judges enjoy greater power in excluding writings when
the opponent objects on Best Evidence Rule grounds than when the
opponent objects on grounds of lack of authentication. As has been
discussed, when ruling on an authentication objection, the judges may
exclude a writing only if in the judge's estimation the proponent's
evidence fails to meet the low prima facie standard. 123 But in ruling
on Best Evidence Rule objections, federal judges may exclude copies
of writings whenever the proponent fails to persuade the judge by a
preponderance of the evidence that non-production of the original
writing is excused. 124 For example, if the opponent objects to the in-
troduction of a copy, the proponent must convince the judge by a
preponderance of the evidence (including the credibility of the wit-
nesses called on the issues) that the original has been lost or de-
stroyed. 125 The persuasion burden is placed on the proponent
because the Best Evidence Rule embodies a public policy favoring the
use of original writings to prove their contents. 126
The Rules, however, recognize that in some instances the power
given to judges to exclude secondary evidence of originals can im-
pinge on the role traditionally assigned to jurors in American trials.1 27
Take a contract dispute in which the opponent contests the propo-
nent's claim that the original has been lost and objects to the intro-
duction of a copy on the ground that no original contract ever
existed. If the judge overrules the objection and admits the copy, the
traditional role of the jurors is preserved-upon request the judge
would instruct the jurors not to consider the copy unless they first
found that the parties entered into the contract and that the copy was
a faithful reproduction of the original contract. But if the judge sus-
tains the opponent's objection and excludes the copy, the ruling
would result in a directed verdict for the opponent. To ensure that
the jurors determine whether the original contract existed, the Rules
reserve that question for them. 128 Similarly, the Rules reserve for the
jurors two additional questions: whether the exhibit offered by the
123. See supra text accompanying notes 9.
124. See FED. R. EVID. 1001.
125. FED. R. EVID. 1008.
126. Id. R. 1004 (Advisory Committee's note).
127. Id. R. 1008 (Advisory Committee's note).
128. Id. R. 1008.
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proponent is the original of the writing, and whether the exhibit cor-
rectly reflects the contents of the writing.12 9
Federal judges, however, are given greater power to withhold
duplicates from jurors. Federal Rule of Evidence 1003 generally allows
a party to offer a duplicate in lieu of the original writing.' 3 0 Since a
duplicate is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the
original,1 31 a counterpart should serve as well as the original in getting
the words or other contents before the fact finder with accuracy and
precision.132 But a federal judge may exclude a duplicate where "(1) a
genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2)
in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu
of the original.' 1 33
Since jurors are generally charged with resolving questions of au-
thenticity, the two exceptions to the use of duplicates warrant discus-
sion. With regard to the first exception, it should be noted that the
objection is not that the duplicate is an unfaithful reproduction.
Rather, the objection is that the duplicate cannot be a reproduction
of the writing the proponent seeks to prove because no such writing,
for example, ever existed. Since production of the original, if there
was one, would facilitate the resolution of this issue, the judge, by ex-
cluding the duplicate, can force the proponent to offer the origi-
nal.13 4 More than a bare objection is required, however. The
opponent must provide the judge with reasons why production of the
original is justified. United States v. Haddock13 5 is illustrative. In this
bank fraud prosecution, the reviewing court upheld the trial judge's
discretionary exclusion of bank record duplicates offered by the de-
fendant. In objecting to the introduction of the duplicates, the gov-
ernment offered the following evidence:
With regard to each of these photocopies, evidence presented at
trial indicates that only Haddock could recall ever seeing either the
original or a copy of these documents. Except for Haddock, no
one-including in some cases persons who allegedly typed the doc-
ument and persons to whom the original allegedly was sent-was
familiar with the contents of the photocopies. In addition, wit-
nesses testified that several of the documents bore markings and
129. Id.
130. See supra text accompanying note 76.
131. FED. R. EID. 1001(4).
132. Id. (Advisory Committee's note).
133. Id. R.1003.
134. 4 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 1003.1 (6th ed., 2006).
135. 956 F.2d 1534 (10th Cir. 1992) (abrogated on a different matter in United States
v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997)).
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included statements that did not comport with similar documents
prepared in the ordinary course of business at the Bank of White
City and at the Bank of Herington. 136
Federal Rule of Evidence 1003(2) also empowers judges to ex-
clude duplicates if "in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit
the duplicate in lieu of the original."1 37 The Advisory Committee de-
scribes one set of circumstances when it would be unfair to admit a
duplicate: "Other reasons for requiring the original may be present
when [the duplicate reproduces only a part of the original] and the
remainder [of the original] is needed for cross-examination or may
disclose matters qualifying the part offered or otherwise useful to the
opposing party."1 3 8
Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick provide other examples of cir-
cumstances requiring the exclusion of duplicates. 139 Judges may ex-
clude duplicates because of their poor quality, because of questions
about the accuracy of the process used to reproduce them, or because
the proponent has destroyed the originals in bad faith. 140 Their con-
cern is with the authenticity of the duplicates-whether they are faith-
ful reproductions of the original writings-as well as with the
authenticity of the original writings-whether the proponent de-
stroyed the originals in bad faith to prevent their use in proving their
contents. 14 1 Although whether a copy is a faithful reproduction of the
original is generally a question for the jury, the Federal Rules em-
power the judge to withhold a duplicate from jurors whenever in the
judge's estimation it would be "unfair" to the opponent to receive the
duplicate. 142 In this instance, however, sharp practices (e.g., destroy-
ing the originals to prevent their use in court) may not be the only
reason for giving the judge the power to exclude duplicates. Their
poor quality, as Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick point out, might
suffice. 143
136. Id. at 1545-1546.
137. FED. R. EVID. 1003(2).
138. Id. (Advisory Committee's note); see also United States v. Alexander, 326 F.2d 736
(4th Cir. 1964).
139. 5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LARD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 574 (2d
ed. 1999).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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2. California Code
Prior to its replacement by the Secondary Evidence Rule, Califor-
nia's Best Evidence Rule was in most ways identical to its federal coun-
terpart. Like the Federal Rules, California's preference for an original
to prove the contents of a writing was relaxed when the proponent
offered a duplicate. 44 California used the federal definition of a du-
plicate 45 and allowed the use of duplicates to the same extent as the
Rules. 146 Former section 1511 provided that a duplicate was "admissi-
ble to the same extent as an original unless (a) a genuine question
[was] raised as to the authenticity of the original or (b) in the circum-
stances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the
original."'14 7
The Secondary Evidence Rule repealed section 1511 and allows
proof of the contents of a writing by an otherwise admissible original
or secondary evidence. 148 The judge, however, must exclude secon-
dary evidence if the court determines one of the following: (1) "[a]
genuine dispute exists concerning material terms of the writing and
justice requires the exclusion,"'149 or (2) "[a]dmission of the secon-
dary evidence would be unfair.' 5 0 As the California Law Revision
Commission acknowledged in its Comment, the exceptions were
modeled on the exceptions to former section 1511 and Federal Rule
1003.15 1
As in the case of Rule 1003(2), the second exception empowers
the judge to withhold secondary evidence from jurors whenever the
judge is convinced that the proponent has engaged in unscrupulous
practices. 152 As the Commission notes, "[a] classic circumstance for
exclusion pursuant to subdivision (a) (2) is [where] the proponent de-
stroyed the original with fraudulent intent .... .153 Also, like Rule
1003(2), the second exception encompasses the authenticity of the
secondary evidence. 54 As an example, the Commission cites Amoco
144. CAL. EVuD. CODE § 1521 (West 1995); FED. R. EVID. 1003.
145. CAL. EviD. CODE § 260 (West 1995); FED. R. EVID. 1001 (4).
146. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1511(repealed by section 1521); see id. §§ 1500-1511.
147. CAL. Evio. CODE § 1511 (repealed 1998).
148. Id. §§ 1520-1521.
149. Id. § 1521(a)(1).
150. Id. § 1521 (a) (2).
151. Id. (comment); FED. R. EVID. 1003 (Commission Reports).
152. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1521.
153. Id. (comment).
154. Id.
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Production Co. v. United States15 5 for the proposition that it would be
unfair to admit a copy that lacked a critical part included in the
original.1 56
As has been noted, a federal judge may also exclude a duplicate
when the judge finds that the opponent has raised a genuine question
about the authenticity of the original. 157 But more than a bare objec-
tion is required for exclusion. The opponent must provide the judge
with reasons why the original must be produced. 58
Similarly, the language of the first exception to the Secondary
Evidence Rule appears to embrace serious questions about the au-
thenticity of the original.1 59 It empowers a California judge to exclude
secondary evidence whenever the opponent convinces the judge that
a genuine dispute exists concerning material terms of the writing and
justice requires its exclusion.1 60 Why the Commission chose this lan-
guage instead of the language of former section 1511 is unclear from
the Comment. It may be that the Commission wanted to make sure
that California judges had the power to exclude secondary evidence
when the parties disagreed about material terms of the original, not
just about the existence of the original, and production of the original
was necessary to resolve the dispute.
The three federal cases and one California case cited by the Com-
mission involve the authenticity of the secondary evidence, not of the
original. 16 1 That may be unimportant, however, since what matters is
that the Commission appears to have intended to follow Federal Rule
of Evidence 1003 and former section 1511; although authenticity is
normally a matter for jury resolution, California judges should have
the authority to exclude secondary evidence when serious questions
about the authenticity of either the secondary evidence or the original
are raised by the opponent.
As a matter of policy, the Best Evidence Rule expresses a prefer-
ence for the use of originals to prove the contents of a writing, unless
an exception applies. 162 The Rules's duplicate original doctrine and
the California Secondary Evidence Rule turn that policy on its head by
allowing the use of duplicates in federal courts and of secondary evi-
155. 619 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980).
156. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1521 (comment).
157. FED. R. EVID. 1003(1).
158. Id.
159. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1521 (a)(1).
160. See id.
161. Id. (comment).
162. FED. R. EVID. 1002.
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dence (including duplicates) in California courts to prove the con-
tents of a writing without accounting for the original. 63 But the
generous treatment accorded duplicates in federal courts and secon-
dary evidence in California courts is not unconditional. If the oppo-
nent raises serious questions about the authenticity of either the
original or the secondary evidence, the judge may exclude the secon-
dary evidence and require the use of the original. 164 The Commis-
sion's Comment includes a useful non-exclusive list of factors judges
should consider in determining whether to exclude the secondary evi-
dence offered. 165 It would be helpful, however, if section 1521 or its
Comment made clear that judges should normally allow jurors to de-
termine disputes concerning the authenticity of the secondary evi-
dence or of the original unless the evidence offered by the opponent
raises the dispute to the level contemplated by section 1521.
E. The Relationship of the Best and Secondary Evidence Rules to
the Requirement of Authentication
Under the traditional Best Evidence Rule, a party must offer the
original of a writing unless production of the original is excused. 166 In
addition, the demands of authentication will force the party to offer
evidence that the writing is what the party claims it to be. 167 For exam-
ple, if in a contract action the plaintiff offers the original of the con-
tract he claims the defendant breached, he must authenticate the
contract as the contract entered into between the parties. If the party
is permitted to offer a copy of the original, then the party must also
authenticate the copy. 168 This means that the party must offer evi-
dence showing that the copy is a faithful reproduction of the original
contract between the parties.
The replacement in California of the Best Evidence Rule with the
Secondary Evidence Rule does not relax the requirement of authenti-
cation. If a party, for example, offers a copy in lieu of the original
contract, over objection the party must offer some evidence that the
copy is a faithful reproduction of the contract between the parties. 169
163. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1521 (West 1995); FED. R. EVID. 1003.
164. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1521.
165. See supra text accompanying note 86.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 75, and 76.
167. See supra text accompanying note 5.
168. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1401(b).
169. Id. § 1521(d); see also id. § 1521(d) (comment).
Summer 2006]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
F. Other Provisions Relating to the Proof of Writings or Copies of
Writings in Official Custody
In the case of some public records, the Code provides for the
simultaneous satisfaction of the requirements of authentication and
the Secondary Evidence Rule. Section 1530(a) (1) provides that if a
copy of a writing in the custody of a public entity "purports to be pub-
lished by the authority of the nation or state, or public entity therein
in which the writing is kept ... [then the copy shall be] prima facie
evidence of the existence and content of [the original]. "170 In addi-
tion, section 1530(a) (2) provides that if the office that houses the
original is within the United States and the office certifies that a copy
is a correct copy of the original, then the copy shall also be prima facie
evidence of the existence and content of the original. 171 To facilitate
the admission of these records, the certification of authenticity may be
received for the truth of the matters stated. 172
The presumptions created by section 1530 affect only the burden
of producing evidence. 173 If the opponent introduces some evidence
indicating that the copy is not a faithful reproduction, the fact finder
will have to determine the correctness of the copy without regard to
the presumptions. 174
Section 1532 allows the use of the official record of a writing that
is recorded as prima facie of the existence and content of the re-
corded writing.' 75 The presumption created by section 1532, like the
one created by section 1530, affects only the burden of producing
evidence. 176
While admission of summaries of the contents of voluminous
books, records, and other documents by definition violates the Best
Evidence Rule, summaries may be the only practical way of making
their contents available to the fact finder. 177 Both the Code and the
Rules permit the use of summaries, whether written or oral. 78 A fed-
170. Id. § 1530(a)(1).
171. Id. The certifying office may also be located in enumerated United States posses-
sions. Id. Section 1530 also provides for the authentication by attestation of copies of writ-
ings kept in offices outside of the United States and its possessions. See id. § 1530(a) (3).
172. Id. (comment).
173. Id. § 1530(b).
174. Id. § 1530(b); id. (comment).
175. Id. § 1532.
176. Id. § 1532(b).
177. FED. R. EVID. 1006 (Advisory Committee's note).
178. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1523(d) (West 1995); see also FED. R. EVID. 1006. Under
section 1521, a written summary of written documents is secondary evidence of the docu-
ments. In the absence of the concerns enumerated in section 1521, the written summary is
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eral judge, however, may order the production of the originals for
inspection by the opposing party.' 79 Presumably, a California judge
would have the same power if the opponent claims that it would be
unfair for the court to admit the summaries.180 To remove any uncer-
tainties about this matter, consideration should be given to amending
the Code to give this authority to California judges.
With regard to business records, section 1550 provides that a pho-
tographic copy can be offered in lieu of the original if the copy was
made and preserved as part of the records of a business in the regular
course of such business.' 8 ' This section is designed to continue the
provisions of the Uniform Photographic Copies of Business and Pub-
lic Records as Evidence Act.18 2 In light of the generous treatment af-
forded duly authenticated copies of originals, the value of section
1550 as an exception to the Secondary Evidence Rule has diminished.
Of greater importance is section 1560. It permits the custodian of
business records to supply copies of the originals in response to a sub-
poena duces tecum.18 3 The copies may be offered in evidence in lieu
of the original records.18 4 In the affidavit accompanying the copies,
the custodian must authenticate the originals as well as the copies. 18 5
The affidavit may be received for the truth of the matters stated. 18 6
As writings, computer printouts are subject to the Secondary Evi-
dence Rule in California. 187 The fact that a printout may be the out-
put of diverse data fed into a computer can raise questions about
whether a particular printout is the "original." To eliminate these con-
as admissible as the documents. For additional discussion, see MENDEZ, supra note 32,
§ 1307.
179. FED. R. EVID. 1006. The authority to use summaries, however, does not in any way
relax other conditions of admissibility. If the originals are inadmissible over a hearsay ob-
jection, for example, then the summaries are likewise inadmissible for the same reason.
180. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1523(d) (West 1995). Under section 1521, a written sum-
mary of written documents is secondary evidence of the documents. In the absence of the
concerns enumerated in section 1521, the written summary is as admissible as the docu-
ments. For additional discussion, see MENDEZ, supra note 32, § 1307.
181. CAL. EVD. CODE § 1550 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006). A photographic copy can in-
clude a "nonerasable optical image reproduction provided that additions, deletions, or
changes to the original document are not permitted by the technology .... " Id. The
proviso would appear to exclude the use of copies generated by printers connected to
computers, since the original in the computer's memory can be changed. See id.
182. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1550 cmt. (West 1995 & Supp. 2006); see also CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1550 (West 1998).
183. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1560 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006).
184. Id. § 1562.
185. Id. § 1561 (a).
186. Id. § 1562.
187. See id. § 1552.
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cerns, section 1552 provides that a "printed representation of com-
puter information or a computer program is presumed to be an
accurate representation of the computer information or computer
program that it purports to represent."188 Combined with section 255,
which defines computer printouts as originals, 189 these provisions sat-
isfy the requirements of the Secondary Evidence Rule and replace the
requirements of authentication. 90 The presumption created by sec-
tion 1552 affects only the burden of producing evidence. 191 If the ob-
jecting party introduces evidence that a printed representation is
inaccurate or unreliable, the offering party must convince the judge
by a preponderance of the evidence that the printed representation is
an accurate representation of the existence and content of the com-
puter information or computer program it purports to represent. 192
Similarly, a printed representation of images stored on a video or
digital medium is presumed to be an accurate representation of the
images it purports to represent.1 93 As in the case of printed represen-
tations of computer information or a computer program, this provi-
sion, together with section 255, satisfies the Secondary Evidence Rule
and replaces the requirements of authentication. 194 As in the case of
section 1552, the presumption created by this section affects only the
burden of production and imposes upon the offering party the same
persuasion burden if a party to the action introduces evidence that
the printed representation of the images is inaccurate or
unreliable.19 5
All of these provisions are a response to California's needs and
should be retained. Other provisions that should also be retained are
sections 1600 through 1605 regarding the admissibility of official writ-
ings affecting property, including Spanish and Mexican land title
records. 196
III. The Completeness Doctrine
The completeness doctrine, like the requirement of authentica-
tion and the Best and Secondary Evidence rules, also applies to the
188. Id.
189. CAL. EVID. CODE § 255 (West 1995).
190. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1552 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1553 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006).
194. Id.
195. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1600-1605 (West 1995).
196. Id.
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introduction of writings.19 7 The doctrine seeks to avoid the misleading
impressions that can be created when matters are taken out of con-
text. t9 8 To diminish this risk, Evidence Code section 356 provides:
[When] part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given
in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be
inquired into by an adverse party; when a letter is read, the answer
may be given; and when a detached act, declaration, conversation,
or writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversa-
tion, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also
be given in evidence. 199
The Federal Rules contain a similar provision, but it is limited to writ-
ings and recorded statements and does not apply to conversations. 20 0
Rosenberg v. Wittenborn201 illustrates section 356's application. The
plaintiffs sued the defendant to recover for injuries they allegedly suf-
fered when the defendant ran a light and struck their car.20 2 To prove
that the defendant ran the light, the plaintiffs called the officer who
investigated the accident.20 3 He testified that at the time he investi-
gated the accident the defendant admitted he had run the red
light.20 4 Over the plaintiffs' objection, the officer was allowed on cross
to testify that the defendant also told him that he ran the light be-
cause his brakes, which had just been repaired, failed unexpectedly.2 0 5
The appellate court upheld the use of the officer's cross-examination
testimony:
Plaintiffs' attorney was trying to leave the jury with the impression
that defendant by way of admission had told the officer... that he
entered the intersection against the red light,-that he said this
and no more. These statements were in fact so qualified when
made to the officer that they carried no implication (such as plain-
tiffs would have the jury draw) that defendant ran the light because
he was going too fast to stop within the distance he had availa-
ble .... Considerations of fair play demanded that the portion of
the conversation placed in evidence by plaintiffs be supplemented
by the qualifying and enlightening portions of the conversation
197. CAL. EVID. CODE § 356 (West 1995).
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. FED. R. EvID. 1006 (Advisory Committee's note). The rule does not extend to
conversations for "practical reasons." See id.
201. 3 Cal. Rptr. 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960). Rosenberg construed the predecessor to sec-
tion 356, California Code of Civil Procedure section 1854. Id. at 464. Former section 1854
was identical to section 256. Id.
202. Id. at 460.
203. Id. at 461-462.
204. Id. at 462.
205. Id.
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which gave a very different complexion than that which plaintiffs'
segregated passages bore.20 6
Rosenberg is instructive in another respect. The fact that the state-
ments offered by the defendant through the officer were hearsay, be-
yond the exception for party admissions, was immaterial. Since the
statement offered by the plaintiffs was received for the truth of the
matter asserted, the balance could also be received for that purpose.
Under these circumstances, the hearsay rule does not bar the use of
such statements. 20 7 Rosenberg also underscores the importance of in-
cluding conversations under the doctrine. Under the federal rule, the
balance of the defendant's conversation could not have been offered
under the completeness doctrine. 20 8 The California rule should be
retained.
IV. Recommendations
Part I compared authentication under the Rules and the Code,
and recommends that the Code more closely mirror the Rules by ex-
plicitly referencing non-writings and providing an additional pre-
sumption of admissibility for commercial and mercantile brands. Part
II explored the differences between the Federal Best Evidence and
the California Secondary Evidence Rules and concludes that Califor-
nia should retain the Secondary Evidence Rule, which recently re-
placed the Best Evidence Rule. Part II also recommended giving
California judges the express authority to exclude summaries of volu-
minous writings when it would be unfair to the opponent to receive
the summaries. Part III discussed the completeness doctrine, which
seeks to avoid the misimpressions that can be created when only part
of a declaration is offered in evidence. This part also recommended
retaining the California provision. Unlike its federal counterpart, it is
not limited to writings but includes conversations as well.
206. Rosenberg, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
207. See id. at 462; see also People v. Williams, 531 P.2d 778, 781-82 (Cal. 1975).
208. FED. R. EvID. 1006.
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V. Appendix
A. Selected Provisions of the California Evidence Code
§ 250. Writing
"Writing" means handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating,
photographing, photocopying, transmitting by electronic mail or
facsimile, and every other means of recording upon any tangible
thing any form of communication or representation, including let-
ters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combinations thereof,
and any record thereby created, regardless of the manner in which
the record has been stored.
§ 255. Original
"Original" means the writing itself or any counterpart intended to
have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An "origi-
nal" of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom.
If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or
other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accu-
rately, is an "original."
§ 260. Duplicate
A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same impression as
the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography,
including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or elec-
tronic rerecording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other
equivalent technique which accurately reproduces the original.
§ 356. Entire act, declaration, conversation, or writing to elucidate
part offered
Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given
in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be
inquired into by an adverse party; when a letter is read, the answer
may be given; and when a detached act, declaration, conversation,
or writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversa-
tion, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also
be given in evidence.
§ 643. Authenticity of ancient document
A deed or will or other writing purporting to create, terminate, or
affect an interest in real or personal property is presumed to be
authentic if it:
(a) Is at least 30 years old;
(b) Is in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning
its authenticity;
(c) Was kept, or if found was found, in a place where such
writing, if authentic, would be likely to be kept or found; and
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(d) Has been generally acted upon as authentic by persons
having an interest in the matter.
§ 644. Book purporting to be published by public authority
A book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority,
is presumed to have been so printed or published.
§ 645. Book purporting to contain reports of cases
A book, purporting to contain reports of cases adjudged in the
tribunals of the state or nation where the book is published, is pre-
sumed to contain correct reports of such cases.
§ 645.1. Printed materials purporting to be particular newspaper or
periodical
Printed materials, purporting to be a particular newspaper or peri-
odical, are presumed to be that newspaper or periodical if regu-
larly issued at average intervals not exceeding three months.
§ 1400. Authentication
Authentication of a writing means (a) the introduction of evidence
sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the propo-
nent of the evidence claims it is or (b) the establishment of such
facts by any other means provided by law.
§ 1401. Authentication required
(a) Authentication of a writing is required before it may be re-
ceived in evidence.
(b) Authentication of a writing is required before secondary evi-
dence of its content may be received in evidence.
§ 1402. Authentication of altered writings
The party producing a writing as genuine which has been altered,
or appears to have been altered, after its execution, in a part mate-
rial to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration or
appearance thereof. He may show that the alteration was made by
another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of
the parties affected by it, or otherwise properly or innocently
made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or lan-
guage of the instrument. If he does that, he may give the writing in
evidence, but not otherwise.
§ 1410. Article not exclusive
Nothing in this article shall be construed to limit the means by
which a writing may be authenticated or proved.
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§ 1410.5. Graffiti constitutes a writing; admissibility
(a) For purposes of this chapter, a writing shall include any graffiti
consisting of written words, insignia, symbols, or any other mark-
ings which convey a particular meaning.
(b) Any writing described in subdivision (a), or any photograph
thereof, may be admitted into evidence in an action for vandalism,
for the purpose of proving that the writing was made by the
defendant.
(c) The admissibility of any fact offered to prove that the writing
was made by the defendant shall, upon motion of the defendant,
be ruled upon outside the presence of the jury, and is subject to
the requirements of Sections 1416, 1417, and 1418.
§ 1411. Subscribing witness' testimony unnecessary
Except as provided by statute, the testimony of a subscribing wit-
ness is not required to authenticate a writing.
§ 1412. Use of other evidence when subscribing witness' testimony
required
If the testimony of a subscribing witness is required by statute to
authenticate a writing and the subscribing witness denies or does
not recollect the execution of the writing, the writing may be au-
thenticated by other evidence.
§ 1413. Witness to the execution of a writing
A writing may be authenticated by anyone who saw the writing
made or executed, including a subscribing witness.
§ 1414. Admission of authenticity; acting upon writing as authentic
A writing may be authenticated by evidence that:
(a) The party against whom it is offered has at any time admit-
ted its authenticity; or
(b) The writing has been acted upon as authentic by the party
against whom it is offered.
§ 1415. Authentication by handwriting evidence
A writing may be authenticated by evidence of the genuineness of
the handwriting of the maker.
§ 1416. Proof of handwriting by person familiar therewith
A witness who is not otherwise qualified to testify as an expert may
state his opinion whether a writing is in the handwriting of a sup-
posed writer if the court finds that he has personal knowledge of
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the handwriting of the supposed writer. Such personal knowledge
may be acquired from:
(a) Having seen the supposed writer write;
(b) Having seen a writing purporting to be in the handwriting
of the supposed writer and upon which the supposed writer
has acted or been charged;
(c) Having received letters in the due course of mail purport-
ing to be from the supposed writer in response to letters duly
addressed and mailed by him to the supposed writer; or
(d) Any other means of obtaining personal knowledge of the
handwriting of the supposed writer.
§ 1417. Comparison of handwriting by trier of fact
The genuineness of handwriting, or the lack thereof, may be
proved by a comparison made by the trier of fact with handwriting
(a) which the court finds was admitted or treated as genuine by the
party against whom the evidence is offered or (b) otherwise proved
to be genuine to the satisfaction of the court.
§ 1418. Comparison of writing by expert witness
The genuineness of writing, or the lack thereof, may be proved by
a comparison made by an expert witness with writing (a) which the
court finds was admitted or treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered or (b) otherwise proved to be genu-
ine to the satisfaction of the court.
§ 1419. Exemplars when writing is more than 30 years old
Where a writing whose genuineness is sought to be proved is more
than 30 years old, the comparison under Section 1417 or 1418 may
be made with writing purporting to be genuine, and generally
respected and acted upon as such, by persons having an interest in
knowing whether it is genuine.
§ 1420. Authentication by evidence of reply
A writing may be authenticated by evidence that the writing was
received in response to a communication sent to the person who is
claimed by the proponent of the evidence to be the author of the
writing.
§ 1421. Authentication by content
A writing may be authenticated by evidence that the writing refers
to or states matters that are unlikely to be known to anyone other
than the person who is claimed by the proponent of the evidence
to be the author of the writing.
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§ 1450. Classification of presumptions in article
The presumptions established by this article [regarding acknowl-
edged and official writings] are presumptions affecting the burden
of producing evidence.
§ 1451. Acknowledged writings
A certificate of the acknowledgment of a writing other than a will,
or a certificate of the proof of such a writing, is prima facie evi-
dence of the facts recited in the certificate and the genuineness of
the signature of each person by whom the writing purports to have
been signed if the certificate meets the requirements of Article 3
(commencing with Section 1180) of Chapter 4, Title 4, Part 4, Divi-
sion 2 of the Civil Code.
§ 1452. Official seals
A seal is presumed to be genuine and its use authorized if it pur-
ports to be the seal of:
(a) The United States or a department, agency, or public em-
ployee of the United States.
(b) A public entity in the United States or a department,
agency, or public employee of such public entity.
(c) A nation recognized by the executive power of the United
States or a department, agency, or officer of such nation.
(d) A public entity in a nation recognized by the executive
power of the United States or a department, agency, or officer
of such public entity.
(e) A court of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.
(f) A notary public within any state of the United States.
§ 1453. Domestic official signatures
A signature is presumed to be genuine and authorized if it pur-
ports to be the signature, affixed in his official capacity, of:
(a) A public employee of the United States.
(b) A public employee of any public entity in the United
States.
(c) A notary public within any state of the United States.
§ 1454. Foreign official signatures
A signature is presumed to be genuine and authorized if it pur-
ports to be the signature, affixed in his official capacity, of an of-
ficer, or deputy of an officer, of a nation or public entity in a
nation recognized by the executive power of the United States and
the writing to which the signature is affixed is accompanied by a
final statement certifying the genuineness of the signature and the
official position of (a) the person who executed the writing or (b)
any foreign official who has certified either the genuineness of the
signature and official position of the person executing the writing
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or the genuineness of the signature and official position of another
foreign official who has executed a similar certificate in a chain of
such certificates beginning with a certificate of the genuineness of
the signature and official position of the person executing the writ-
ing. The final statement may be made only by a secretary of an
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular
agent, or other officer in the foreign service of the United States
stationed in the nation, authenticated by the seal of his office.
§ 1520. Content of writing; proof
The content of a writing may be proved by an otherwise admissible
original.
§ 1521. Secondary evidence rule
(a) The content of a writing may be proved by otherwise admissible
secondary evidence. The court shall exclude secondary evidence of
the content of writing if the court determines either of the
following:
(1) A genuine dispute exists concerning material terms of the
writing and justice requires the exclusion.
(2) Admission of the secondary evidence would be unfair.
(b) Nothing in this section makes admissible oral testimony to
prove the content of a writing if the testimony is inadmissible
under Section 1523 (oral testimony of the content of a writing).
(c) Nothing in this section excuses compliance with Section 1401
(authentication).
(d) The section shall be known as the "Secondary Evidence Rule."
§ 1522. Additional grounds for exclusion of secondary evidence
(a) In addition to the grounds for exclusion authorized by Section
1521, in a criminal action the court shall exclude secondary evi-
dence of the content of a writing if the court determines that the
original is in the proponent's possession, custody, or control, and
the proponent has not made the original reasonably available for
inspection at or before trial. This section does not apply to any of
the following:
(1) A duplicate as defined in Section 260.
(2) A writing that is not closely related to the controlling issues
in the action.
(3) A copy of a writing in the custody of a public entity.
(4) A copy of a writing that is recorded in the public records, if
the record or a certified copy of it is made evidence of the
writing by statute.
(b) In a criminal action, a request to exclude secondary evidence
of the content of a writing, under this section or any other law,
shall not be made in the presence of the jury.
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§ 1523. Oral testimony of the content of a writing; admissibility
(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, oral testimony is not
admissible to prove the content of a writing.
(b) Oral testimony of the content of a writing is not made inadmis-
sible by subdivision (a) if the proponent does not have possession
or control of a copy of the writing and the original is lost or has
been destroyed without fraudulent intent on the part of the propo-
nent of the evidence.
(c) Oral testimony of the content of a writing is not made inadmis-
sible by subdivision (a) if the proponent does not have possession
or control of the original or a copy of the writing and either of the
following conditions is satisfied:
(1) Neither the writing nor a copy of the writing was reasona-
bly procurable by the proponent by use of the court's process
or by other available means.
(2) The writing is not closely related to the controlling issues
and it would be inexpedient to require its production.
(d) Oral testimony of the content of a writing is not made inadmis-
sible by subdivision (a) if the writing consists of numerous accounts
or other writings that cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time, and the evidence sought from them is only the general
result of the whole.
§ 1530. Copy of writing in official custody
(a) A purported copy of a writing in the custody of a public entity,
or of an entry in such a writing, is prima facie evidence of the exis-
tence and content of such writing or entry if:
(1) The copy purports to be published by the authority of the
nation or state, or public entity therein in which the writing is
kept;
(2) The office in which the writing is kept is within the United
States or within the Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, or the Ryukyu Islands, and the copy is at-
tested or certified as a correct copy of the writing or entry by a
public employee, or a deputy of a public employee, having the
legal custody of the writing; or
(3) The office in which the writing is kept is not within the
United States or any other place described in paragraph (2)
and the copy is attested as a correct copy of the writing or entry
by a person having authority to make attestation. The attesta-
tion must be accompanied by a final statement certifying the
genuineness of the signature and the official position of (i) the
person who attested the copy as a correct copy or (ii) any for-
eign official who has certified either the genuineness of the
signature and official position of the person attesting the copy
or the genuineness of the signature and official position of an-
other foreign official who has executed a similar certificate in a
chain of such certificates beginning with a certificate of the
genuineness of the signature and official position of the per-
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son attesting the copy. Except as provided in the next sen-
tence, the final statement may be made only by a secretary of
an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consu-
lar official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the
United States. Prior toJanuary 1, 1971, the final statement may
also be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, consular agent, or other officer in
the foreign service of the United States stationed in the nation
in which the writing is kept, authenticated by the seal of his
office. If reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties
to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of the documents,
the court may, for good cause shown, (i) admit an attested
copy without the final statement or (ii) permit the writing or
entry in foreign custody to be evidenced by an attested sum-
mary with or without a final statement.
(b) The presumptions established by this section are presumptions
affecting the burden of producing evidence.
§ 1531. Certification of copy for evidence
For the purpose of evidence, whenever a copy of a writing is at-
tested or certified, the attestation or certificate must state in sub-
stance that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or of a
specified part thereof, as the case may be.
§ 1532. Official record of recorded writing
(a) The official record of a writing is prima facie evidence of the
existence and content of the original recorded writing if:
(1) The record is in fact a record of an office of a public entity;
and
(2) A statute authorized such a writing to be recorded in that
office.
(b) The presumption established by this section is a presumption
affecting the burden of producing evidence.
§ 1550. Types of evidence as writing admissible as the writing itself
(a) If made and preserved as part of the records of a business, as
defined in Section 1270, in the regular course of that business, the
following types of evidence of a writing are as admissible as the
writing itself:
(1) A nonerasable optical image reproduction or any other re-
production of a public record by a trusted system, as defined in
Section 12168.7 of the Government Code, if additions, dele-
tions, or changes to the original document are not permitted
by the technology.
(2) A photostatic copy or reproduction.
(3) A microfilm, microcard, or miniature photographic copy,
reprint, or enlargement.
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(4) Any other photographic copy or reproduction, or an en-
largement thereof.
(b) The introduction of evidence of a writing pursuant to subdivi-
sion (a) does not preclude admission of the original writing if it is
still in existence. A court may require the introduction of hard
copy printout of the document.
§ 1551. Photographic copies where original destroyed or lost
A print, whether enlarged or not, from a photographic film (in-
cluding a photographic plate, microphotographic film, photostatic
negative, or similar reproduction) of an original writing destroyed
or lost after such film was taken or a reproduction from an elec-
tronic recording of video images on magnetic surfaces is admissi-
ble as the original writing itself if, at the time of the taking of such
film or electronic recording, the person under whose direction
and control it was taken attached thereto, or to the sealed
container in which it was placed and has been kept, or incorpo-
rated in the film or electronic recording, a certification complying
with the provisions of Section 1531 and stating the date on which,
and the fact that, it was so taken under his direction and control.
§ 1552. Printed representation of computer information or
computer programs
(a) A printed representation of computer information or a com-
puter program is presumed to be an accurate representation of the
computer information or computer program that it purports to re-
present. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden
of producing evidence. If a party to an action introduces evidence
that a printed representation of computer information or com-
puter program is inaccurate or unreliable, the party introducing
the printed representation into evidence has the burden of prov-
ing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the printed repre-
sentation is an accurate representation of the existence and
content of the computer information or computer program that it
purports to represent.
(b) Subdivision (a) shall not apply to computer-generated official
records certified in accordance with Section 452.5 or 1530.
§ 1553. Printed representation of images stored on a video or
digital medium
A printed representation of images stored on a video or digital me-
dium is presumed to be an accurate representation of the images it
purports to represent. This presumption is a presumption affecting
the burden of producing evidence. If a party to an action in-
troduces evidence that a printed representation of images stored
on a video or digital medium is inaccurate or unreliable, the party
introducing the printed representation into evidence has the bur-
den of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
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printed representation is an accurate representation of the exis-
tence and content of the images that it purports to represent.
B. Selected Provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence
Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded
Statements
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is intro-
duced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at
that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded state-
ment which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously
with it.
Rule 901. Requirement of Authentication or Identification
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or iden-
tification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what its proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limi-
tation, the following are examples of authentication or identifica-
tion conforming with the requirements of this rule:
(1) Testimony of Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that a matter
is what it is claimed to be.
(2) Nonexpert Opinion on Handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to
the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not ac-
quired for purposes of the litigation.
(3) Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness. Comparison by the trier
of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been
authenticated.
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. Appearance, contents,
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteris-
tics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.
(5) Voice Identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard
firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or
recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any
time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged
speaker.
(6) Telephone Conversations. Telephone conversations, by evi-
dence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time
by the telephone company to a particular person or business, if
(A) in the case of a person, circumstances, including self-iden-
tification, show the person answering to be the one called, or
(B) in the case of a business, the call was made to a place of
business and the conversation related to business reasonably
transacted over the telephone.
(7) Public Records or Reports. Evidence that a writing authorized
by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a
public office, or a purported public record, report, statement,
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or data compilation, in any form, is from the public office
where items of this nature are kept.
(8) Ancient Documents or Data Compilation. Evidence that a docu-
ment or data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condi-
tion as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B)
was in a place where it, if authentic, would likely be, and (C)
has been in existence 20 years or more at the time it is offered.
(9) Process or System. Evidence describing a process or system
used to produce a result and showing that the process or sys-
tem produces an accurate result.
(10) Methods Provided by Statute or Rule. Any method of authenti-
cation or identification provided by Act of Congress or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu-
tory authority.
Rule 902. Self-authentication
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to ad-
missibility is not required with respect to the following:
(1) Domestic Public Documents Under Seal. A document bear-
ing a seal purporting to be that of the United States, or of any
State, district, Commonwealth, territory, or insular possession
thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, or of a political subdivision, department,
officer, or agency thereof, and a signature purporting to be an
attestation or execution.
(2) Domestic Public Documents Not Under Seal. A document
purporting to bear the signature in the official capacity of an
officer or employee of any entity included in paragraph (1)
hereof, having no seal, if a public officer having a seal and hav-
ing official duties in the district or political subdivision of the
officer or employee certifies under seal that the signer has the
official capacity and that the signature is genuine.
(3) Foreign Public Documents. A document purporting to be
executed or attested in an official capacity by a person author-
ized by the laws of a foreign country to make the execution or
attestation, and accompanied by a final certification as to the
genuineness of the signature and official position (A) of the
executing or attesting person, or (B) of any foreign official
whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official posi-
tion relates to the execution or attestation or is in a chain of
certificates of genuineness of signature and official position re-
lating to the execution or attestation. A final certification may
be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul gen-
eral, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United
States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign coun-
try assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable
opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the au-
thenticity and accuracy of official documents, the court may,
for good cause shown, order that they be treated as presump-
tively authentic without final certification or permit them to be
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evidenced by an attested summary with or without final
certification.
(4) Certified Copies of Public Records. A copy of an official
record or report or entry therein, or of a document authorized
by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in
a public office, including data compilations in any form, certi-
fied as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to
make the certification, by certificate complying with paragraph
(1), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying with any Act of Con-
gress or rule prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to stat-
utory authority.
(5) Official Publications. Books, pamphlets, or other publica-
tions purporting to be issued by public authority.
(6) Newspapers and Periodicals. Printed materials purporting
to be newspapers or periodicals.
(7) Trade Inscriptions and the Like. Inscriptions, signs, tags, or
labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of busi-
ness and indicating ownership, control, or origin.
(8) Acknowledged Documents. Documents accompanied by a
certificate of acknowledgment executed in the manner pro-
vided by law by a notary public or other officer authorized by
law to take acknowledgments.
(9) Commercial Paper and Related Documents. Commercial
paper, signatures thereon, and documents relating thereto to
the extent provided by general commercial law.
(10) Presumptions Under Acts of Congress. Any signature,
document, or other matter declared by Act of Congress to be
presumptively or prima facie genuine or authentic.
(11) Certified Domestic Records of Regularly Conducted Ac-
tivity. The original or a duplicate of a domestic record of regu-
larly conducted activity that would be admissible under Rule
803(6) if accompanied by a written declaration of its custodian
or other qualified person, in a manner complying with any Act
of Congress or rule prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority, certifying that the record-
(A) was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the
matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge of those matters;
(B) was kept in the course of the regularly conducted ac-
tivity; and
(C) was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regu-
lar practice.
A party intending to offer a record into evidence under this
paragraph must provide written notice of that intention to all
adverse parties, and must make the record and declaration
available for inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer
into evidence to provide an adverse party with a fair opportu-
nity to challenge them.
(12) Certified Foreign Records of Regularly Conducted Activ-
ity. In a civil case, the original or a duplicate of a foreign re-
cord of regularly conducted activity that would be admissible
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under Rule 803(6) if accompanied by a written declaration by
its custodian or other qualified person certifying that the re-
cord-
(A) was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the
matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge of those matters;
(B) was kept in the course of the regularly conducted ac-
tivity; and
(C) was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regu-
lar practice.
The declaration must be signed in a manner that, if falsely
made, would subject the maker to criminal penalty under the
laws of the country where the declaration is signed. A party
intending to offer a record into evidence under this paragraph
must provide written notice of that intention to all adverse par-
ties, and must make the record and declaration available for
inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence
to provide an adverse party with a fair opportunity to challenge
them.
Rule 903. Subscribing Witness' Testimony Unnecessary
The testimony of a subscribing witness is not necessary to authenti-
cate a writing unless required by the laws of the jurisdiction whose
laws govern the validity of the writing.
Rule 1001. Definitions
For purposes of this article the following definitions are applicable:
(1) Writings and Recordings. "Writings" and "recordings" con-
sist of letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down
by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating,
photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic
recording, or other form of data compilation.
(2) Photographs. "Photographs" include still photographs, X-
ray films, video tapes, and motion pictures.
(3) Original. An "original" of a writing or recording is the writ-
ing or recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the
same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An "original" of
a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If
data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or
other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accu-
rately, is an "original".
(4) Duplicate. A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the
same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or
by means of photography, including enlargements and minia-
tures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chem-
ical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which
accurately reproduces the original.
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Rule 1002. Requirement of Original
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the
original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as
otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress.
Rule 1003. Admissibility of Duplicates
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless
(1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the origi-
nal or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the
duplicate in lieu of the original.
Rule 1004. Admissibility of Other Evidence of Contents
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of
a writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if-
(1) Originals Lost or Destroyed. All originals are lost or have
been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them
in bad faith; or
(2) Original Not Obtainable. No original can be obtained by
any available judicial process or procedure; or
(3) Original in Possession of Opponent. At a time when an
original was under the control of the party against whom of-
fered, that party was put on notice, by the pleadings or other-
wise, that the contents would be a subject of proof at the
hearing, and that party does not produce the original at the
hearing; or
(4) Collateral Matters. The writing, recording, or photograph
is not closely related to a controlling issue.
Rule 1005. Public Records
The contents of an official record, or of a document authorized to
be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed, including data
compilations in any form, if otherwise admissible, may be proved
by copy, certified as correct in accordance with rule 902 or testified
to be correct by a witness who has compared it with the original. If
a copy which complies with the foregoing cannot be obtained by
the exercise of reasonable diligence, then other evidence of the
contents may be given.
Rule 1006. Summaries
The contents of voluminous writings, records, or photographs
which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented
in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or
duplicates, shall be made available for examination or copying, or
both, by other parties at reasonable time and place. The court may
order that they be produced in court.
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Rule 1007. Testimony or Written Admission of Party
Contents of writings, recordings, or photographs may be proved by
the testimony or deposition of the party against whom offered or
by that party's written admission, without accounting for the non-
production of the original.
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